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COURTS

FEDERAL

Does an Individual Lacking Contractual
Privity Have Standing Under §1981 to
Bring aClaim for Racial Discrimination?
by Ralph C. Anzivino
PREVIEW of United States Supreme Court Cases, pages 128-134. © 2005 American Bar Association.

Ralph Anzivino is a professor
at Marquette University Law
School in Milwaukee, Wisconsin.
He can be reached at
RCAnzivino@aol.com
or (414) 288-5365.

ISSUE
In the absence of a contractual relationship, are allegations of personal
injury through racial discrimination
sufficient to confer standing under
42 U.S.C. § 1981?
FACTS
Petitioners Domino's Pizza, LLC,
and Domino's Pizza, Inc., had four
contracts with JWM Investments,
Inc., under which JWM agreed to
build restaurants and lease them to
Domino's. Respondent John
McDonald is the president and sole
shareholder of JWVM. The first
restaurant was completed within the
timeframe specified in the contracts. The second encountered a
variety of problems, including difficulties with city zoning. These problems led to delays in construction,
and the relationship between JWM
and Domino's soured. The contracts
between JWMI and Domino's stated
that Domino's would execute "estoppel certificates" for JWIVI if necessary for financing and/or sale purposes. An estoppel certificate is a
tenant's written description of its
interest in property, which enables
prospective mortgagees or pur-

chasers to evaluate the nature and
extent of the tenant's interests.
McDonald alleges that Domino's
employee Deborah Pear Phillips
refused to sign such requests by
JWM. Subsequently, McDonald and
Phillips had a telephone conversation in which they discussed the
problems that had arisen. McDonald
claims that he expressed an intention to complete the projects, but
that Phillips told him she would see
to it that he would experience financial repercussions if he continued.
Phillips allegedly told McDonald, "I
don't like dealing with you people
anyway." She also allegedly stated
that she would see to it that
Domino's did no further business
with McDonald. From that point on,
McDonald's calls to Domino's were
forwarded to Joel Graziani in the
general counsel's office. Graziani
told McDonald that, notwithstanding
Phillips's alleged comments,
Domino's was prepared to sign the
estoppel certificates and move forward with the projects, but only if
the lease contracts were amended.
The contracts were not amended,
and the relationship between
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Domino's and JWM deteriorated
until Domino's ultimately terminated the contracts. Although Domino's
adamantly denies the charge,
McDonald alleges that Domino's
decision to terminate its contract
with JWM was motivated by racial
discrimination because McDonald is
African American. He also alleges
that JWM had various financial difficulties after the termination of the
JWM-Domino's contracts, leading to
JWM's eventual bankruptcy.
JWM brought a claim against
Domino's arising from this contract
dispute during JWM's Chapter 11
bankruptcy proceedings. Domino's
settled that claim for $45,000 in
exchange for a complete release
from JWM, and the bankruptcy
court accepted the settlement. After
settling the claim brought on behalf
of JWM, McDonald filed this lawsuit
against Domino's in his individual
capacity. His complaint alleges a
violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981, which
protects the right "to make and
enforce contracts" free from discrimination. The complaint
acknowledges that the only contracts at issue were between JWM
and Domino's. Domino's moved to
dismiss the complaint under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) on
the ground that McDonald lacked
statutory standing to sue. Domino's
argued that 42 U.S.C. § 1981 protects the contractual relationship
and, since McDonald was not a party to the contracts at issue, his allegations of injury were not covered
by the statute. The district court
agreed. The district court reasoned
that § 1981 protects the contractual
relationship itself and therefore limits the class of persons who may sue
under § 1981 to persons in the contractual relationship. The court further held that while JWM might
have a claim under § 1981, a president or sole shareholder may not
step into the shoes of the corporation and assert that claim personal-

ly. The court granted the motion
and dismissed the complaint with
prejudice.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit
reversed in a summary order.
McDonald v. Domino's Pizza, 2004
U.S. App. Lexis 12176. The court
ruled that it was bound to follow a
prior Ninth Circuit case, Gomez v.
Alexian Brothers Hospital, 698 F.2d
1019 (9th Cir. 1983). In Gomez, a
Hispanic physician who practiced
medicine as an employee of a professional corporation brought an
individual suit when the defendant
hospital rejected the corporation's
contract to operate its emergency
room for allegedly racial reasons.
Analyzing the physician's claim
I under Title VII, the Ninth Circuit
ruled that Gomez had alleged sufficient injury because he had alleged
injuries that were distinct from that
of the corporation, including loss of
employment, and humiliation and
embarrassment. The court noted
that the same discriminating conduct can result in both corporate
and individual injuries. Applying
Gomez, the Ninth Circuit held that,
although McDonald was not formally
a party to the contract, he may
nonetheless sue under § 1981 insofar as he seeks recovery for individual injuries separate and distinct
from contract damages suffered by
JWM Investments, Inc. The
Supreme Court granted certiorari
on April 25, 2005.
CASE ANALYSIS
Petitioner Domino's asserts that a
discrete individual injury does not
create statutory standing or a federal cause of action. The question of
standing is whether the litigant is
entitled to have the court decide the
merits of the dispute or of particular
issues. It involves both constitutional limitations on federal-court jurisdiction and statutory limitations on
its exercise. The constitutional limits on standing flow from Article III's

case or controversy requirement.
Article III standing requires that (1)
the plaintiff have suffered an injury
in fact that is both concrete and
particularized and actual or imminent; (2) the injury be fairly traceable to the acts of the defendant;
and (3) it is likely, as opposed to
conjectural, that the injury will be
resolved by a favorable decision. If a
plaintiff does not satisfy that test,
then Congress cannot grant that
party any federal cause of action
because deciding the case would
force the federal courts to exceed
their constitutional power. It is
undisputed that McDonald could
have standing under Article III.
Accepting the respondent's allegations as true, the respondent is
claiming concrete injuries that were
allegedly caused by Domino's termination of the JWM contracts, and
those injuries would be redressed by
the monetary damages he seeks. But
the presence of Article III standing
establishes only that Congress could
grant McDonald a right to judicial
relief in these circumstances. It
does not establish that such relief is,
in fact, available. A plaintiff suing
under a federal statute must also
demonstrate that the statute grants
statutory standing. That is a question of statutory interpretation.
The "statutory standing" analysis
ultimately reduces to whether the
statutory provision on which the
claim rests properly can be understood as granting persons in the
respondent's position a right to judicial relief. The Supreme Court has
recognized two presumptions about
when Congress intends to grant
statutory standing to sue. First,
there is a presumption that the
plaintiff generally must assert his
own legal rights and interests and
cannot rest his claim to relief on the
legal rights or interests of third parties. Second, there is a presumption
that a plaintiff will not have stand(Continued on Page 130)
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ing to sue unless his complaint falls
within the zone of interests to be
protected or regulated by the
statute or constitutional guarantee
in question.
The presumption that a plaintiff
cannot ordinarily assert the legal
rights of third parties serves two
principal purposes. First, courts
should not adjudicate such rights
unnecessarily, and it may be that in
fact the holders of those rights
either do not wish to assert them or
will be able to enjoy them regardless
of whether the in-court litigant is
successful or not. Second, because
third parties themselves usually will
be the best proponents of their own
rights, both the courts and those
third parties generally prefer legal
rights to be construed only when
the most effective advocates of
those rights are before the court.
Those rules combine to produce the
principle that plaintiffs asserting
some collateral injury caused by a
violation of some other party's
statutory rights generally lack standing. The Ninth Circuit's conclusion
that McDonald suffered a separate
and distinct individual injury is

wholly insufficient to establish
statutory standing. In addition to a
discrete personal injury, McDonald
must also establish that Congress
intended to grant a person in his
position a right to recover under
§ 1981. Respondent is required to
show that he is within the zone of
interests protected by the statute
and that he is asserting his own
statutory rights rather than the
rights of a third party.
Petitioner Domino's maintains that
§ 1981 does not authorize suit by
persons who have not been denied
the right to "make and enforce contracts." The text, history, and consistent judicial interpretation of
§ 1981 make clear that the only
persons with standing to sue under
§ 1981 are those who have actually

suffered some injury to that right.
The right to "make and enforce contracts" is defined to include the
making, performance, modification,
and termination of contracts and
the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the
contractual relationship. 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981(b). The plain language
makes clear that the statute grants
to every person the right to be free
from racial discrimination in their
own actual or prospective contractual relationships. The statute by its
terms only provides redress for the
discriminatory impairment of the
rights protected by this section. 42
U.S.C. § 1981(c). It does not grant a
cause of action for all injuries
caused by discrimination in the
contractual relationship of others.
The legislative history to § 1981
clearly indicates that Congress
intended to protect a limited category of rights. The language of the
statute traces its origin to § 1 of the
Civil Rights Act of 1866, which was
enacted shortly after the ratification
of the Thirteenth Amendment. The
language of the 1866 act was re-codified in virtually identical form as
part of the Enforcement Act of 1870
and is now 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a).
Notably, Congress removed a broad
opening declaration to the 1866 act
that stated that "there shall be no
discrimination in civil rights or
immunities among citizens on
account of race, color, or previous
condition of slavery." Out of concern
that this language could be interpreted as encompassing a too-broad
spectrum of rights, the language was
deleted. The removal of that passage
sharply undercuts the view that the
1866 act reflects broader concerns
than the specific rights identified in
its text.
Several decades ago, the Supreme
Court recognized that § 1981
applies to private discrimination as
well as to state action. But it has

nonetheless consistently described
§ 1981 as limited to interference
(public or private) with the specific
right to "make and enforce contracts." And in every case in which
this Court has examined the scope
of § 1981, the plaintiff was in a contractual relationship and alleged a
violation of a right to make or
enforce a contract.
Section 1981 does not grant thirdparty standing to persons whose
own right to "make and enforce
contracts" has not been violated. It
is well settled that § 1981 protects
only an individual right to "make
and enforce contracts" free from
racial discrimination. The "zone of
interests" protected by § 1981 is
that right, nothing more and nothing less. Nothing in the statute sugI gests any intent by Congress to
abrogate the ordinary standing rules
and permit suit by persons whose
own right to "make and enforce
contracts" has not been violated,
merely because they have suffered
some discrete injury traceable to
the violation of someone else's right
under § 1981. Section 1981 does
not contain any provision comparable to other statutes that would
authorize suit by "any person"
harmed by a violation of its provisions. It grants a set of specific, personal rights and grants statutory
standing only to persons who have
suffered an injury to those rights.
McDonald has suffered no injury to
his personal right to "make and
enforce contracts" free from racial
discrimination, because he has not
alleged any contract to which he
was personally a party or to which
he hoped to be a party. The only
contracts at issue in this case are
between two corporations, JWM and
Domino's. McDonald has not alleged
the existence of any other contract
that might provide the grounds for a
cause of action under § 1981. All
rights and obligations under these

Issue No. 3

contracts belong to JWM and not to
McDonald. If JWM had breached the
contracts, McDonald could not be
sued for breach. Also, the allegations that Domino's breached those
contracts were properly brought
(and settled) by JWM. A violation of
JWM's right to "make and enforce"
these contracts would not, even if
proven, establish any injury to
McDonald personally that is cognizable under § 1981.
Petitioner Domino's opines that
allowing McDonald to sue would
upset the balance of the civil rights
laws. The fact that McDonald has no
cause of action under § 1981 for his
individual injuries does not suggest
any gap in the coverage of the
nation's civil rights laws. It is entirely consistent with the comprehensive statutory regime Congress has
enacted to combat racial discrimination and with well-understood
state common-law principles.
Permitting McDonald's claim to proceed would have far-reaching and
disruptive consequences. The law
simply does not create a remedy for
every harm. The general rule is that
there is no cause of action to recover collateral, derivative injuries suffered by persons other than the person whose statutory rights were
actually violated. And, when the
injury in question is pain and suffering, emotional distress, and humiliation, the law has always imposed
strict limitations on recovery.
Indeed, a claim by an affiliate of a
contracting party for emotional distress caused by a breach of contract
is a complete stranger to the law.
Further, emotional distress is not
generally compensable under contract law in any event. Emotional
distress damages, however, can be
recovered in tort, but generally only
when incident to an actual physical
injury. Recovery for purely emotional injuries under the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress is permitted only when the

emotional injury is severe and the
defendant's conduct is both intentional and outrageous. Federal civil
rights laws also impose strict limitations on relief for purely emotional
distress. Under Title VII an employee has no redress for emotional
injuries caused by racially offensive
statements unless those statements
are so severely or pervasively abusive as to create a hostile work environment. The alleged comment that
McDonald claims caused him to
experience emotional distress simply does not rise to that level as a
matter of law. A section 1981 cause
of action in these circumstances
would, therefore, be inconsistent
with the background law that governs comparable claims in other
contexts.
Allowing anyone collaterally injured
by an alleged violation of § 1981 to
sue under that statute would also
radically expand the class of plaintiffs that can sue for discrimination
under federal law. Although the
unique circumstances of this case
allow McDonald to claim that he
was the direct target of the alleged
discrimination, his theory of recovery cannot be limited. The class of
potential plaintiffs is essentially limitless. The termination of any contractual relationship will have
effects that ripple outward through
the economy. When a general contractor loses a contract, that loss
may also injure his wife and children, his employees, his subcontractors and their families and employees, the lumber supplier that would
have sold to the subcontractor, the
lumber supplier's own timber supplier, and so on forever. The potential
injuries extend even beyond persons in the direct chain of economic
consequences. A bystander could
suffer emotional distress injuries of
the sort alleged by McDonald. A
right to be free from all collateral
consequences of racial discrimination in the private contracting

behavior of others, anywhere in our
vast economy, would therefore be
an extremely radical innovation.
In summary, the petitioner contends that that if there was any cognizable injury to the right "to make
and enforce contracts" flowing from
the termination of the JWMDomino's contracts, that injury was
suffered by JN, not McDonald.
JWM brought a breach of contract
claim against Domino's and settled
it. If JWM had wanted to join a
claim under § 1981 to that breach
of contract claim, it could have
done so. And, if McDonald had
wished to enter into a personal contractual relationship with Domino's
himself, he possibly could have
done that as well. What he cannot
do is use the corporate form to
intentionally distance himself from
any individual contractual relationship with Domino's, and then turn
around and sue for injury to that
contractual relationship in his personal capacity. McDonald himself
has not suffered any injury to the
specific interests protected by
§ 1981 and, therefore, cannot
bring suit under that statute.
Respondent McDonald maintains,
however, that § 1981 protects the
actual targets of contract-related
discrimination regardless of whether
they contract through formal intermediaries. Section 1981 provides
that all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have
the same right in every State and
Territory to make and enforce contracts. In construing § 1981 and the
parallel provision of 42 U.S.C.
§ 1982, which originated in the
same sentence of the Civil Rights
Act of 1866, the Supreme Court
extended its protections to cover
intentional racial discrimination to
two classes of individuals. First, sections 1981 and 1982 protect targets
of discrimination when they are
(Continued on Pagce 132)
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1981 should be accorded a sweep as
broad as its language. Section 1981
provides that all persons have a
right to be free from discrimination
"to make and enforce contracts,"
not merely to make and enforce
their own contracts.

actual or would-be contract signatories or property owners. Second,
sections 1981 and 1982 protect the
actual targets of discrimination
when they are conducting their
activities through an actual or
would-be signatory or owner. As an
African American entrepreneur conducting his business through a
wholly owned corporation, respondent falls squarely within this wellrecognized second category.

Respondent asserts that his ability
to engage in business and sell his
labor free from racial discrimination
lies at the core of § 1981's protections. The provisions of § 1981
regarding discrimination in contracting were enacted to guarantee
the personal right to engage in economically significant activity free
from racially discriminatory interference. Congress adopted the 1866
Civil Rights Act as a comprehensive
charter designed to protect the
hard-won liberty of the freedmen
and to ensure that they could rely
on their skills and initiative to
advance their economic interests.
The protections enumerated in § 1
of the act encompassed every right
that the framers knew or could foresee that the former slaves might
require in order to participate fully
in economic life. Congress stopped
short of an unrestricted prohibition
against all forms of discrimination
only because of a concern that it
might be construed to extend to
political rights. The rights enacted
in § 1 should be given full effect and
construed to reach new devices and
schemes intended to deny individuals the ability to hold and enjoy the
proceeds of their toil on the basis
of race.

Respondent argues that the most
natural reading of the plain language
of § 1981 protects the contracting
behavior of actual targets of discrimination regardless of whether
they are formal signatories. For
example, there is no question that
Domino's would be liable to
McDonald if he had operated his
business as a sole proprietorship.
The question then is whether
McDonald lost the protection of
§ 1981 when he organized his business as a corporation instead.
Nothing in the text of § 1981 supports Domino's contention that
actual targets of discrimination are
somehow stripped of protection
when they do business through a
corporation. To the contrary, when
a minority entrepreneur like
McDonald does business through a
corporation, the terms of § 1981
protect both the actions taken by
the entrepreneur and the benefits
that he or she receives from the
transaction.
Petitioner Domino's insists that the
reference in § 1981 to the right to
"make and enforce contracts"
grants to potential plaintiffs only the
right to be free from racial discrimination in their own actual or
prospective contractual relationship.
But the words "their own" (or "his
own") simply are not to be found in
the language of § 1981. The failure
of Congress to include such a limitation cannot be dismissed as a mere
slip of the legislative pen. Section

The zone of interests protected by a
I

statute such as § 1981, which is
directed at racial discrimination, is
manifestly different from the zone
of interests protected by traditional
contract law. The basic purpose of
the common law of contracts, and of
statutes such as the Uniform
Commercial Code providing for the
enforcement of contracts, is to protect the interests of contracting par-
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ties and of certain intended thirdparty beneficiaries. Thus, if a statelaw contract action were brought
against Domino's, the zone of interests protected by Nevada contract
law presumably would be limited to
JWM, as a contracting party, and to
any intended third-party beneficiaries. But the purpose of § 1981 is to
protect against racial discrimination. The overarching purpose of
Reconstruction was not to deal with
a sudden rash of contract violations,
i but to secure the freedom of the former slaves and to ensure that they
could participate in the economic
life of the nation unencumbered by
racial discrimination. Thus, the
interests asserted by McDonald to
conduct business and to be compensated for his labor unimpeded by
racial discrimination lie at the very
heart of the concerns that § 1981
was fashioned to address.
Respondent argues that § 1981 protects the actual targets of discrimination even when they do business
through a corporate intermediary.
Racial discrimination based on the
race of the owner or employees of a
corporation easily falls within the
scope of § 1981. In modern business
transactions, corporations often
play an essential intermediate role.
Where racial discrimination related
to contracts occurs because of the
race of a corporation's owneroperator, the owner-operator is the
actual target of that unlawful discrimination, while the corporation
itself is an intermediate victim. In
the modern world, a number of
practical, economic, legal, and tax
considerations may compel individuals to conduct their affairs through
corporations or other intermediate
parties. If in those cases an entity
could lawfully discriminate against
someone because of his or her
race, millions of American workers
would fall outside the protections
of § 1981.

Issue No. 3

If § 1981 did not permit recovery of
the damages sustained by the actual
target of discrimination whenever a
corporation or other intermediary
was involved, significant injuries
caused by violations of § 1981
would go unredressed. There are a
number of types of discriminatory
practices that will injure only the
actual target of the discrimination,
but not the intermediate person or
entity. For example, racial harassment of an owner or employee of a
corporation will not injure the corporation itself unless it somehow
causes lost profits. In the case now
before the Court, McDonald asserts
that Domino's officials engaged in a
number of actions that injured
McDonald personally but could not
have harmed JWM, including
threats, verbal abuse, and interference with McDonald's personal business activities. In Domino's view,
none of these injuries, however
intentional or foreseeable, would be
actionable under § 1981. The complaint in this case sought damages
for the pain and suffering, mental
anguish, and humiliation suffered by
McDonald. This sort of noneconomic injury is one of the most serious
consequences of discriminatory
action. It is an injury for which only
individuals can seek redress.
Corporations do not themselves
have feelings. When owners or
employees are the actual targets of
discrimination and as a result suffer
distinct personal injuries, permitting
them to obtain redress for those
injuries will not impose excessive
liability on the wrongdoer. Those
individual plaintiffs may only obtain
damages for personal injuries that
are separate from the harms suffered by a related corporation. The
courts are competent to ensure that
no double recovery occurs. The
total amount of damages will be no
greater than would have been
awarded if the discrimination had
been inflicted on a sole proprietorship. The only difference will be

that that amount will be divided
among the several victims.
Respondent McDonald believes that
§ 1981 does not impose on entrepreneurs a Hobson's choice of either
giving up the right to incorporate or
forsaking full relief for violations of
the right to be free from discrimination. Petitioner Domino's argues
that an entrepreneur who chooses
to do business through a corporation thereby forfeits the right to
redress for personal injuries that
would have been compensable
under § 1981 if he or she had been
doing business as a sole proprietorship. The interpretation of § 1981
advocated by Domino's would work
just such a forfeiture, denying relief
under § 1981 to minority entrepreneurs who for a variety of legal and
practical reasons must incorporate.
McDonald contends that Congress
cannot have intended to impose
such a Hobson's choice on the victims of racial discrimination.
Neither the development of modern
corporation law nor the growing
complexity of federal income tax
law could have been foreseen by the
Congress that adopted the 1866
Civil Rights Act. But assuredly neither that Congress, nor the
Congress that adopted the 1991
Civil Rights Act amending § 1981,
intended to compel entrepreneurs
to abandon the protections or the
possibility of full redress under
§ 1981 if they chose to conduct
their business through a corporation. The imposition of such a forfeiture would codify in federal law
the very type of discriminatory barriers to economic self-advancement
that § 1981 was enacted to prevent.
Finally, the respondent maintains
that its claim fits within the normal
claims that arise under § 1981. The
claims that are cognizable under
§ 1981 share three critical elements. They involve (1) purposeful
racial discrimination by the defen-

dant, (2) directed intentionally at a
person who is the plaintiff or a party
with whom the plaintiff is in privity
(that is, with whom the plaintiff has
a contractual relationship), (3) that
is intended to impair the formation,
performance, enforcement, or
enjoyment by the plaintiff of the
benefits of a specific contractual
opportunity. Although none of these
elements requires a contractual
relationship between the plaintiff
and the discriminator, they
nonetheless cabin the category of
cases that can be brought. For
example, a plaintiff whose car was
destroyed in a racially motivated
firebombing would fail to state a
§ 1981 claim if he alleged only that
the defendant interfered with his
housing rights and intimidated him.
While the defendant's act could conceivably be related to some potential contractual opportunity, if a
plaintiff fails to point to any specific
contract with which the defendant
had interfered, he fails to state a
claim. By contrast, in this case, the
complaint alleges each of the elements of a § 1981 claim against a
third-party discriminator. First, it
alleges racial animus by Domino's.
Second, the complaint alleges that
Domino's racially discriminatory
conduct was directed intentionally
at McDonald and the business he
owned. Thus, respondent was not
an incidental victim of Domino's
discriminatory conduct, but rather
its primary target. Third, given the
context of Domino's discriminatory
actions, which were directed at
respondent in his capacity as
owner-operator or JWM, the complaint clearly alleges that Domino's
discrimination impaired his contracts with JWM. According to the
respondent, the critical flaw in
Domino's analysis is that it assumes
that § 1981 authorizes suit only by
persons whose own right to "make
and enforce contracts" has been
infringed. This necessarily means
(Continued on Page 134)
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that the plaintiff's right must involve
a contract with the defendant. To
the contrary, however, as long as
the plaintiff is alleging that the discrimination intentionally impaired
his right to make a contract, the
fact that the discriminators' own
contractual rights and responsibilities are not at issue is irrelevant.
SIGNIFICANCE
Section 1981 is one of the bedrock
federal statutes designed to protect
an individual's civil rights. The title
to the section is "Equal rights under
the law." The statute provides that
"all persons within the jurisdiction
of the United States shall have the
same right in every State and
Territory to make and enforce contracts." Although the statute defines
what it means to make and enforce
contracts, it does not define whether
an individual must be a party to the
contract to have standing to assert a
claim under the § 1981.
The respondent, a minority entrepreneur, asserts that § 1981 must be
broadly construed to address all
racial discrimination that may cause
one to be denied his or her equal
rights under the law. The fact that
he chose to conduct his business in
a representative capacity should not
deprive him of the right to bring a
claim for racial discrimination. On
the other hand, Domino's believes
that before one can assert standing
under the contract language of
§ 1981, one must be a party to the
contract. The scope of § 1981 is a
very significant issue, and in this
case the Supreme Court may define
its reach.
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